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This paper analyzes the modularization in the world auto industry. The modularization 
in the industry has involved architectural changes in product, production, and supplier 
systems with each region (Japan, Europe and the U.S.A.) emphasizing different 
purposes and aspects. As an attempt to understand such multi-faceted, complex 
processes coherently, this paper proposes a conceptual framework that sees 
development / production activities as interlinked, multiple hierarchies of products, 
processes, and inter-firm boundaries. With this framework, drawing on case studies 
and questionnaire survey data, the paper examines the on-going processes of 
modularization in the industry. It is argued that tensions exist among the three 
hierarchies, and such tensions may lead to further changes in product, production and 
supplier-system architectures in the auto industry, in a dynamic and path-dependent 
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     The concept of "modularization" has attracted increasing attention in the auto 
industry in the last few years. The meanings and purposes of modularization in this 
industry vary between regions and companies. There is no clear-cut definition of the 
term shared by the whole industry. Yet, there does exist a feature relatively common 
across various practices of modularization in the industry. It entails having larger units 
in subassembly and also often involves outsourcing these subassemblies to suppliers 
(as most frequently observed in the European auto industry). 
     This fact suggests that there are at least three facets in the phenomenon called 
“modularization”: 1) “modularization in product architecture” (modularization in 
design) which has been discussed quite often in the field of the management of 
technology; 2) “modularization in production;” and 3) “modularization in inter-firm 
system” (outsourcing subsystems in larger units to outside suppliers). These three 
facets have often been mixed up, causing confusion in discussing modularization. 
While the European auto industry has been interested mainly in outsourcing, the 
Japanese has focused on modularization in production. Neither of them has addressed 
“modularization in product architecture.” As we look further into the on-going 
practices in the auto industry, however, we can detect some changes that may lead to 
modularization in product architecture.   
     We observe in the auto industry such complicated, multi-faceted, and sometimes 
confusing processes of modularization. If we could present a single conceptual 
framework within which all trends in the industry can be analyzed somehow 
consistently, it would be a contribution to further our understanding of the concept of 
modularization. This is why this paper focuses on the auto industry. This paper also  
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aims at probing into dynamic interactions and architectural changes between three 
systems —— product, production, and inter-firm systems. Since modularization in the 
auto industry is still in a fluid, transitional stage at this moment, the industry provides 
us with a particularly interesting field where we can witness in real-time such dynamic 
interactions and architectural changes. 
     The next section of this paper lays out a conceptual framework that sees 
development and production activities for automobiles as multiple hierarchies of 
product, production, and inter-firm systems. This framework serves as the platform to 
be applied for the subsequent analysis. The following section describes the 
modularization in the auto industry. We investigate what is actually happening in the 
industry and the rationales behind these changes, while comparing the practices of 
modularization in the Japanese, European, and the U.S. auto industries [1]. We then 
discuss how some changes in production and supplier systems would lead to changes 
in product architecture. The paper concludes by summarizing our analysis and 
discussing some implications for the future of the auto industry. 
 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION 
SYSTEMS FOR AUTOMOBILES AS MULTIPLE HIERARCHIES 
 
     Before investigating the actual practices of modularization being implemented in 
the auto industry, we would like to propose a conceptual framework as the premise for 
the analysis. One of this paper’s purposes is to discuss the concepts of “modularization 
in product system,” “modularization in production system,” and “modularization in 
inter-firm system” within the same framework, and identify the differences and 
linkages between them. This framework is based on the concept of “multiple  
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hierarchies.” It sees development-production activities for automobiles as multiple, 
interlinked hierarchies. It contends that the hierarchies in product, production, and 
inter-firm systems make up one complex system where the three systems are related 
with each other (this framework is based on [2]). 
     Let us explain each of the three facets of modularization with this concept of 
“multiple hierarchies.” First, “modularization in product” is defined in terms of the 
interrelation between the “Product Function Hierarchy” and the “Product Structure 
Hierarchy.” We can illustrate such an interrelation with diagrams like those shown in 
Figure 1 (1) (for example, [3]). The left diagram is a schematic representation of the 
so-called “integral” product. Since the elements making up the product function (the 
left triangle) are interrelated with those making up the product structure (the right 
triangle) in a complex manner, the designer of Subsystem [S1] has to take the 
following factors into account:  
1)  functional interdependence with the other subsystems (such as s1膩f1膩s2, and s1
膩f2膩s2) 
2)  structural interdependence with the other subsystems (physical interference, for 
example, s1膩s2) 
3)  interdependence with the design of the entire system (consistency with the design 
of the whole system, s1膩S1膩S) 
4)  interdependence between the sub-functions (such as f1臌f2, and F1臌F2). 
“Modularization in product” decreases such interdependence between the 
concerned elements. It allows one-to-one correspondence between the subsystems and 
their functions, and enables, for example, the designer of Subsystem [S1] to focus 
solely on Sub-function [F1] and [S] (the structure of the product as a whole). The  
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subsystem becomes a “module with a self-contained function,” which can be designed 
more autonomously. Remaining interdependence after modularization can further be 
reduced if the interfaces between the elements are simplified and standardized as much 
as possible. 
     We can illustrate “modularity in production” with the similar diagrams as shown 
in Figure 1 (2). It is comprised of the “Product Structure Hierarchy” (right triangle) 
and the “Product Process Hierarchy” (left). In order to simplify our explanation, among 
the whole manufacturing processes, we focus here only on assembly work in the
腧Product Process Hierarchy.” It is important to note that the “Product Structure 
Hierarchy” in this figure, as part of “Multiple Hierarchies of Product Structure and 
Production Processes,” and its counterpart in the previous “Multiple Hierarchies of 
Product Function and Product Structure” might have different hierarchical patterns. 
The former hierarchy is built up in pursuit of “functional independence” of each 
subsystem (i.e., the degree to which a function of the product is achieved by a single 
subsystem), while the latter is made up for “structural cohesiveness” (i.e., the degree to 
which a collection of parts can be physically handled as one unit).  The latter 
hierarchy is intended to contribute to “structurally cohesive modules” which are easy 
to manage material handling and quality control. The difference between those two 
hierarchies can be understood by observing the parts list for the product design which 
is not same as the one for production management. 
     The left diagram represents non-modular production processes. Without any 
“structurally cohesive large modules,” the product is to be assembled from eight small 
modules (s1 to s8) at the same hierarchical level on one long main assembly line. On 
the contrary, in the right diagram, there are two structurally-cohesive modules “S1 and  
5 
S2” on the right, and two subassembly lines to build them and one short main line for 
finished products on the left (remember the famous watchmaker story in [4]). It can be 
said that the “Product Structure Hierarchy” with cohesive modules is translated into the 
“Product Process Hierarchy” with one main line and two subassembly lines. 
     Finally, let us explain “modularization in inter-firm system,” in which outside 
suppliers conduct and deliver subassemblies. The inter-firm division of labor in 
development and production (an automaker’s boundaries between in-house operations 
and outsourcing, or make-or-buy) can be defined for each of all steps of 
development-production activities from product function designing, product structure 
designing, production process designing, production preparation, to production. Here 
we focus on the division of labor in production processes which we often refer to when 
we talk about the make-or-buy decisions. That is to draw the boundaries of the 
involved companies over the production process hierarchy of the preceding diagram, as 
shown in Figure 1 (3). “Modularization in inter-firm system,” which has drawn 
increasing attention in the European auto industry, entails outsourcing subsystems in 
large units (cohesive modules) to suppliers. The left diagram is a schematic 
representation of production with a higher in-house ratio, in which small modules (s1 - 
s8) are delivered by outside suppliers. On the contrary, the right represents production 
based on a highly modular supplier system, in which large modules are assembled by 
outside suppliers on their subassembly lines, and are delivered and assembled into 
finished products on the main line of the automaker. We can apply the same illustration 
to describe the outsourcing of product designing (the so-called “approved drawings” or 
“black-box components”). 
     Overall, the three facets of modularization and their interrelations can be  
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illustrated within the same framework of multiple hierarchies as shown in the three 
pairs of diagrams. Product engineers, process engineers, and purchasing managers 
must make decisions about the product and process hierarchies and the inter-firm 
boundaries, while securing close coordination between them. It is obvious that these 
three facets of modularization must not be mixed up. At the same time, it is also clear 
that these decisions are interrelated with each other. They are the processes of making 
decisions about interrelated hierarchies of product functions, product structure, and 
production processes. There is always a possibility of some inconsistency or conflict 
between the decisions. In a sense, the most critical challenge in modularization is how 
to avoid or overcome such inconsistency and conflict through coordination. 
     We have discussed the three decision-making processes from a rather static point 
of view thus far. Such decisions, however, in reality, are probably being made in a 
cumulative manner over time in most cases. We therefore have to take 
“path-dependency” into account —— the outcome may depend on the specific 
sequence of decision-making. 
     The following section probes into the actual practices of “modularization” in both 
Western and Japanese auto industries. Let us briefly summarize our analysis 
beforehand. Western automakers have a strong inclination toward “modularization in 
inter-firm system,” or outsourcing, which has stimulated “modularization in 
production.” One of their challenges is to cope with the inconsistency or conflict 
created between such “modularization in procurement/production” and 
“modularization in product architecture.” Japanese automakers, on the contrary, have 
focused on in-house “modularization in production” thus far and have been relatively 
quiet about aggressive outsourcing adopted by Western counterparts. Automakers in  
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Japan instead seem to seek for “modularization in product architecture” facilitated by 
the need for the functionality and conformance quality of modules assembled on 
in-house subassembly lines. Since Western and Japanese auto industries have been 
following different paths in implementing modularization, their product architectures, 
production process hierarchies, and boundaries between in-house operations and 
outsourcing could be diverse, as they emerge. 
 
 
3. MODULARIZATION IN THE WORLD AUTO INDUSTRY 
3.1.  European and U.S. Auto Industries 
     It is two German automakers, Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz (presently 
Daimler-Chrysler), that geared up the auto industry's modularization in the mid-1990s. 
Their new assembly plants, which started production in 1996 and 197, introduced 
modularization on a large scale, specifically at Volkswagen’s plants in Resende 
(Brazil), Boleslav (Czech), and Mosel (former East Germany), and Mercedes-Benz's 
plants in Vance (U.S.) and Hambach (France).   
     These plants share two characteristics. One is that they have assembled cars from 
relatively large subassemblies. A car is a system made up of numerous components. 
There is a wide choice of managerial units at the intermediate stage in the process of 
putting them into a car. These plants have departed from the conventional way of 
assembling cars. At conventional plants, individual components —— for example, 
instrument panels, gauges, and wire harnesses —— one by one to a vehicle body on 
the final assembly line. Instead, at those new plants, these individual components are 
sub-assembled on a separate line, and then installed as a module into a body on the  
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final assembly line. In the framework we discussed in the previous section, this is to 
redesign the hierarchy in production processes by setting a new intermediate layer to it 
(as shown in the right diagram of Figure 1 (2)). Automakers in the world have divided 
cars into many parts in order to make development and production processes 
manageable. As some automakers have drastically redesigned the hierarchies in their 
development and production processes through modularization, others have also begun 
exploring new hierarchies. 
     The second characteristic shared by these plants is that they have let outside 
suppliers develop and assemble subassemblies. In the previous framework, this means 
to narrow the scope of in-house operations in the hierarchy of the inter-firm system 
(moving the inter-firm boundaries up to a higher hierarchical level), as shown in the 
right diagram of Figure 1 (3). MCC’s plant in Hambach is a typical example of such 
outsourcing. MCC is a joint venture of Mercedes-Benz and SMH (a Swiss watch 
manufacturer), which assembles a two-seater small-sized car called “Smart.” A group 
of suppliers called as “system partners” surround MCC’s assembly plant. They build 
large modules such as cockpit modules, rear axle modules, and door modules, and 
deliver them directly to MCC’s final assembly line. MCC even outsources body 
welding and painting, which traditionally automakers carry out in-house. Automakers 
in the United States have not yet become as aggressive in pursuing modularization as 
these German companies have. However, they have indicated their intention of letting 
their so-called “full-service” system suppliers handle larger sets of components in 
development and production.  
     There are three main reasons why Western automakers have been expanding the 
scope of outsourcing. First, they want to take advantage of the suppliers’ lower labor  
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costs. Second, they can cut investment costs and risk by giving more important 
responsibilities to the suppliers [5]. Third, these moves toward modularization have 
also been accelerated by their policy of reducing the number of the first-tier suppliers.  
This idea was originally taken from the Japanese automakers' approach [6, 7, 8]. 
However, compared to their Japanese rivals, European manufacturers are already 
letting their suppliers handle larger modules. It seems that a strong sense of crisis that 
it has been difficult to make profits from their car business underlies their aggressive 
outsourcing. In other words, they have been seeking outsourcing as part of an attempt 
to redesign “business architecture” [9].   
     Responding to and promoting such demand from manufacturers, there have been 
a growing number of mergers and acquisitions among suppliers in the United States 
and Europe. They aim at establishing themselves as module suppliers and expanding 
business with major automakers by becoming qualified to manage the development 
and production of a larger set of components as a module [10].  
     There are, however, some cases where module suppliers are assigned only to 
sub-assemble the components, each of which is still manufactured and designed by the 
incumbent suppliers. In these cases automakers still maintain control over the choice of 
suppliers for the individual components, as well as the management of their prices, 
quality, and design. Automakers have chosen to do so partly because they think that 
module suppliers are not capable of handling all aspects of the module. They are also 
concerned that extensive outsourcing to a limited number of suppliers may make the 
costs and technology of components unknown to themselves, reduce competitive 
pressure for suppliers, and thus weaken their own negotiation power. Nevertheless, 
such limited outsourcing probably only offers the limited advantage of cheap labor. It  
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does not appeal to suppliers either because they are treated only as simple 
subcontractors with little added value while asked to invest lots of money and take 
risks. Automakers are still in the process of exploring where they should draw the 
boundaries in their development and production activities. 
         
3.2.  Japanese Auto Industry 
     Unlike the U.S. and European auto industries, the Japanese auto industry has 
shown few visible initiatives toward modularization. But when we looked closely into 
what Japanese companies are doing, through interviews and a questionnaire survey, we 
found out that they were dealing with the issue in a different style with different aims.   
     First, let us look at the results of our questionnaire survey [11]. We conducted a 
questionnaire survey with 153 first-tier suppliers in February and March 1999. In this 
survey, the term “modularization” was not used because there was no commonly 
shared definition of it. Instead, a number of questions about several important aspects 
of modularization were asked to capture recent changes in the industry. The 
respondents were asked the degree of changes over the last four years (a typical model 
changeover cycle) in 19 measures regarding design and production processes of their 
components.   
     A factor analysis of the responses has identified the following four factors: 1) 
component standardization, 2) shift to integral architecture, 3) functional 
independence/interface simplification, and 4) expansion of the subassembly scope. The 
results of this factor analysis suggest that it is difficult to generalize what is meant by 
modularization because it involves multiple dimensions [12].  
     Table 1 shows the average scores of the answers. The biggest change over the last  
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four years was “shift to integral architecture.” The functions assigned to individual 
parts had become more complex (Item 17), and the need for structural or functional 
coordination with other components had increased (Items 18 and 19). These changes 
were in an opposite direction to modularization. Note that we see signs of 
modularization in architecture in the increase of component sharing within each 
customer (automaker) (Items 6, 7, 13 and 14). Yet, the scope of component sharing was 
quite limited to among variations of a particular model, or at most, among different 
models of an automaker. There had been almost no attempts for component sharing 
across different automakers (Items 8 and 15). Further, there had been only little 
progress in the functional independence of components and the simplification of 
interfaces (Items 11, 12 and 16). There had been a very small number of cases where 
automakers had asked their suppliers to sub-assembly a larger set of components 
(Items 2, 3 and 4).  
     To sum up, the product architecture had become more integral, although some 
automakers had shown some interest in the use of standardized components and 
interfaces. On the other hand, there had been almost no progress in the type of 
modularization prevalent in the European and the U.S. auto industry, namely 
outsourcing of subassemblies in larger units to suppliers. 
     However, the above survey tells only about what component suppliers saw. If we 
look at what is happening inside automakers, a different picture appears. Figure 2 
shows the results of our interviews (conducted from March to July, 1999) with eight 
Japanese automakers, about to what extent components around the instrument panels 
were sub-assembled before installed on the main assembly line for some of their 
models. It plots the number of component types sub-assembled for the model (vertical  
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axis) and the year in which the model in question was introduced to the market 
(horizontal axis). The scores were all mean-centered for adjustment across automakers. 
We could see a positive correlation. The newer the model was, the wider the scope of 
the subassembly. In other words, there has been some progress in having 
subassemblies in larger units inside automobile assemblers. 
     Then, why have Japanese automakers promoted the in-house use of 
subassemblies? They have done so partly because they were stimulated by American 
and European rivals who have been actively adopting modularization. But some 
automakers are interested in modularization with a different perspective. It is based on 
their pursuit of “autonomous and complete” assembly lines.   
     Japanese automakers have traditionally built highly integral assembly lines, as 
epitomized by the famous Toyota's lines, for maximum efficiency. In order to eliminate 
any non-value-adding time, “muda,” they have combined different tasks flexibly. The 
improvement of the efficiency of each final assembly line as a whole has always been a 
number one priority. For the same reason, Japanese automakers have had their workers 
trained for multiple tasks and skills (“tanoko”). In short, the hierarchy shown in the left 
diagram of Figure 1 (2) has been most favored. The sequence of assembly processes 
and worker assignments have always been rearranged to achieve the maximum 
efficiency under changing situations. The introduction of a subassembly line, which 
involves the isolation of a particular set of tasks from the main line, as shown in the 
left diagram, hinders flexible task rearrangement for optimizing the whole system. For 
example, those workers assigned to the subassembly line are not to help their 
colleagues at the main line even when a problem occurs. On this account, they have 
traditionally been reluctant to have subassembly lines in their plants. But they have  
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begun changing their views since the early 1990s for several reasons.  
    First, automakers have placed a greater importance on their employees’ 
satisfaction from their work. This change originated in the serious shortage of workers 
during the bubble economy [13]. It has also been influenced by the necessity of dealing 
with the growing number of female and elderly workers. The adoption of subassembly 
lines improves the workers’ satisfaction in two respects. First, working for a 
subassembly line allows workers to maintain a comfortable working position (better 
ergonomics). Suppose your job is to attach various components around the instrument 
panel. If you work on a main line, you may have to stand in a torturous position, 
leaning over the panel in the car. By contrast, if you work on a subassembly line, you 
can maintain a relatively comfortable working position, standing while attaching all the 
components to the panel. In addition, it is considered that handling a functionally 
related set of tasks helps you understand the significance of your work. This would 
motivate and satisfy workers. 
     Second, they have placed a greater importance on self-contained quality control 
system. According to this idea, the quality of each subassembly is inspected upon its 
completion, not on the final line as part of a finished product, in order to find defects at 
the earliest stage possible. The adoption of self-contained quality control has facilitated 
the adoption of subassemblies to be inspected upon completion. This is closely related 
to the significance of work mentioned above. If you can check the quality of a 
subassembly you have just completed, you can gain a sense of your work's significance 
and accomplishment. 
With an increasing emphasis on workers’ satisfaction and self-contained quality 
control, Japanese automakers have been replacing their conventional integral lines with  
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new self-contained lines, and thus been adopting more and more subassemblies [14]. 
However, they have been reluctant to outsource the subassemblies to outside suppliers, 
as confirmed in the results of the previous questionnaire survey as well as our 
interviews with automakers. This is a big difference compared to the European auto 
industry where modularization often proceeds with outsourcing [15].  
     There are some reasons for this reluctance. First, the cost advantage in 
outsourcing modules is not so great in Japan because the wage gap between 
automakers and the first-tier suppliers is narrow compared to Western counterparts. 
Second, in order to have outsourced subassemblies delivered in sequence to the main 
line on short lead times, the suppliers’ shops should be located within a very short 
distance from the assembling plants. Yet investment opportunities for building such 
new facilities are currently quite limited in Japan. Even if this is possible, automakers 
are concerned that each plant might rely too much on the particular suppliers selected, 
and thus its competitive pressure toward them might be reduced. Third, automakers 
have been doubtful about the capability of suppliers to handle a larger scope of tasks 
since Japanese suppliers have long specialized in the development and production of 
individual functional components. It is also true that Japanese automakers have a 
dislike for losing knowledge about the technology and costs of any parts involved. The 
absence of those component suppliers who have proactively had mergers and 
acquisitions in order to develop and produce larger modules as emerging in the United 
States and Europe, has also kept Japanese automakers primarily focused on in-house 
subassemblies. 
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4.  REDEFINING PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 
     As we have discussed thus far, the modularization in the auto industry has 
centered upon the redefinition of hierarchies in production system and inter-firm 
system. The former entails the expanded use of subassemblies, the change common in 
the Japanese, European and U.S. auto industries. The latter involves the expanded use 
of outsourcing, which has been prevalent in Europe and the U.S., but inconspicuous in 
Japan. 
     The redefinition of hierarchies in production and inter-firm systems is essentially 
different from modularization in product system (as shown in Figure (1)). In the first 
place, cars are usually categorized as relatively integral products in terms of product 
architecture [16], and thus are difficult to be modularized further. But if we probe into 
what is happening in the industry, we observe some movements in which the 
redefinition of hierarchies in production and inter-firm systems may lead to 
modularization in product architecture. 
      Among such movements is the redesigning of the components necessitated by 
the adoption of subassemblies, which has been addressed by Japanese automakers. The 
use of subassemblies has some disadvantages. A subassembly built from many 
components is difficult to handle because of its size and weight. Such a subassembly is 
also difficult to be fitted perfectly onto other subassemblies or the body. Accuracy in 
assembling work is difficult to achieve with subassemblies compared to that of smaller, 
individual components. If some additional parts or fixtures are needed only to ensure 
ease of handling and accuracy, it would end up with an unacceptable increase in costs 
and weight. Furthermore, unless the assignment of functions to some components is 
redefined, it may be often impossible to check the quality of a sub-assembled module  
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[17].  
     In order to solve these problems brought up by modularization, Japanese 
automakers have put great emphasis on redesigning the components within a 
subassembly module. Such efforts include the integration of some components into 
others for reduced cost and weight, and the re-assignment of functions to realize the 
self-contained quality control (for example, making the functions of an instrument 
panel module more independent so that the quality of its electric system can be tested 
independently). These attempts are nothing but the redefinition of product architecture. 
The integration of some components into others involves making the product 
architecture of certain sets of components more integral. Making the function of a set 
of components more independent entails the modularization of the set. 
     Such attempts to redesign have been triggered by the redefinition of the 
hierarchies in production systems, and may lead to the redefinition of organizational 
boundaries (following the path: “Modularization in Production System”膨
“Modularization in Product Architecture”膨“Modularization in Inter-firm System”) 
(See Figure 3). According to Fujimoto and Ge [18], the “approved drawings” (or 
“black-box components”) are more likely to be adopted for certain parts for which the 
responsibilities for quality control can be clearly defined. In other words, such parts 
can be outsourced because the functions assigned to them can be managed by outside 
suppliers as independent, self-contained units. If the redefinition of product 
architecture allows us to redefine the scope of quality control responsibilities in larger 
units, development and production within that scope could be outsourced more easily 
to outside suppliers. As a result, outsourcing of development and production would be 
further promoted.    
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     Some Western automakers include “a testable set of components” as the important 
conditions for modularization. This suggests that the assignment of independent 
(testable) functions has been treated as an important requirement for outsourcing. This 
implies the sequence that “Modularization in Inter-firm and Production Systems” 
facilitates “Modularization in Product Architecture” (Figure 3). 
     Probably the most outstanding example of products developed in this manner is 
“Smart” being manufactured in the aforementioned MCC plant. This car is comprised 
of a highly unique body frame called a TRIDION cell and plastic body panels. Unlike 
the integral architecture of ordinary passenger cars with a mono-cock body, Smart’s 
product architecture was designed to be built from modules. Bosch, one of the largest 
component suppliers in the world, once pointed out that one of the requirements for 
successful modular production was to design a car optimized for modules, and cited 
Smart as an example. The development of such a car can be described as a process in 
which the division of labor with outside suppliers expedites the redefinition of the 
relationships between functions and structures to define explicit conditions for contract 
and evaluation measures, and, as a result, the architecture of the product becomes 
modularized.  
     Product architecture would be redefined in the process of modularization in both 
the Japanese and European auto industries. But the difference in the paths they have 
followed might make their new architecture different in nature (Figure 3). In Japan, the 
redefinition of product architecture has been addressed under the leadership of 
automakers in cooperation with multiple suppliers [19]. In Europe, automakers have 
often outsourced a large set of components to a single supplier (who has become a 
module supplier through mergers and acquisitions), and the redefinition of product  
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architecture is pursued according to the inter-firm boundaries in this relationship. If 
knowledge of the entire product is the most important requirement for the redefinition 
of its architecture, the automaker-led style of the Japanese auto industry might have an 
advantage. On the other hand, the supplier-led redefinition of architecture in Europe 
and the United States might bring about more innovative architecture that no 
assemblers could have ever recognized.  
      It should be noted that modularization in this industry is basically adopted for 
individual models. Even Western automakers use particular modules for particular 
plants or models. There has been no case of adopting the same modules across 
different models or plants. The same applies to subassemblies and design 
rationalization in the Japanese auto industry. In this sense, the modularization in the 
auto industry is essentially different from open modularization observed in personal 
computers, bicycles, and stereo component systems. If an automaker outsources design 
tasks in very large units to one particular supplier, the free hand given to the supplier 
might allow it to pursue the component sharing and standardization to a certain extent. 
However, since the optimization of each model for better product integrity is of great 
importance in the industry, we have not seen any extensive attempt toward the 
commonalization and standardization of interfaces across different automakers [20].   
   
   
5. DISCUSSION: DYNAMICS OF MODULARIZATION IN THE AUTO 
INDUSTRY 
 
      Modularization in the auto industry is still in the trial and error stage. The 
industry began addressing the issue only several years ago. The contexts and purposes 
of modularization vary across regions and companies. So it is still quite uncertain and  
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unpredictable how it will be evolved and what impacts it will have. Our argument is 
therefore no more than speculation. Yet, it would be safe to say that on-going processes 
concerning modularization provide us with some interesting cases to explore the 
dynamics surrounding architectural changes.   
      What lies in the center of the dynamics is interactions between production 
system, inter-firm system, and product architecture. Changes in the hierarchies in 
production system and/or inter-firm system cause tension in their relationships with 
product architecture, and thus encourage the redefinition of product architecture.   
      Baldwin and Clark [21] pointed out that the issue of modularization involves 
“modularity in design,” “modularity in use,” and “modularity in production” (though 
their discussion primarily focused on “modularity in design”). Sako and Murray [22] 
argued that each of these has its own optimal architecture, and thus well-balanced 
relationships among them should be maintained in the process of modularization. This 
suggests that these three aspects of modularization are correlated with each other and 
close coordination among them is necessary. Sako and Murray further pointed out that 
coordination has to be secured between product architecture and organizational 
architecture (intra-firm and inter-firm organizations) as well. Echoing with their 
argument, this paper also suggests that changes in inter-firm system might lead to 
changes in product architecture. It is well known that modularization in product 
architecture sometimes changes the structure of the division of labor in the industry 
(from a vertical industry structure to a horizontal industry structure) [23]. This paper 
suggests that the relationship between product architecture and inter-firm system is 
two-way —— not only the former influences the latter, but also the latter has some 
impact on the former.  
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      As argued in Section 2 on the analytical framework, the hierarchies in product 
system, namely hierarchies in product structure and product function, correspond to 
those in production system and inter-firm system. Hierarchical structure of a complex 
system is formed as a method to rationalize the division of labor [4]. Each of product, 
production, and inter-firm systems has its own logic of the division of labor. 
Hierarchies in production system and inter-firm system change in their own contexts 
(for example, the improvement of workers’ satisfaction, the utilization of the wage gap 
between different companies, the reallocation of risk and investment burden, and so 
on). And such changes in production and inter-firm systems would demand changes in 
product architecture. Conditions within design activities are not a sole factor for 
changes in product architecture. European automakers, for example, are exploring new 
architectures across inter-firm, production, and product systems in search of a more 
profitable business model (though the outcomes are still yet to be seen). 
      Modularization in the auto industry seems to proceed with hierarchical changes 
in each of product, production, and inter-firm systems in its own context and with its 
own logic, and at the same time evolve through dynamic interactions among these 
multiple systems of hierarchies. If this is the case, the key to successful modularization 
for automakers probably lies in close cooperation and coordination between their 
development, production and purchasing functions, as well as with their suppliers. 
      Given different business environments, different capabilities and strategies, and 
different paths toward modularization, we might see the co-existence of various 
patterns of modularization in the world auto industry. Also, there could be a scenario 
for multiple patterns of modularization being used for different product lines and 
market segments. Or, if any particular pattern would command an outstanding  
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competitive leadership, the entire industry may be converged into that pattern of 
modularization. The future of modularization depends on which pattern would allow 
automakers to design and produce cars with greatest values for consumers. 
      The future of technological innovations in the medium or long term is also 
important. The urgent need to protect the environment has accelerated the competition 
for a new power source (such as hybrid engines and fuel cells) to replace the 
conventional internal-combustion engines. With rapidly advancing information and 
communication technologies, the development of ITS (Intelligent Transportation 
System) has also been progressing. The growing importance of information 
technologies in vehicles has made the role of software much more important, and thus 
may facilitate a kind of modularization through the separation of hardware and 
software. When those new technologies are put into practical use, the architecture of 
cars will have to be totally redesigned and such changes will inevitably influence 
production and inter-firm systems as well. It is anticipated, under such circumstances, 
new architectures (for product, production and inter-firm systems) of the auto industry 
will be established through dynamic interactions between on-going attempts of 
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Figure 1 Multiple Hierarchies of Product, Production and Supply Systems 
(2) Modularization in Production
(Multiple Hierarchies of Product Structure and Production Processes)
 Legends: P = Production  Process as a whole, S = Product Structure as a Whole,
P1, P2= Main Line Processes,  p1-p2= Sub-line processes,  S1, S2 = Large Modules
            =connection in terms of product designing or process designing      s1-s4= Small modules
腀         = Process Flow
































































 (1) Modularization in Product 
 (Multiple Hierarchies of Product Function and Product Structure)
Designing A Product with Integral Architecture Designing A Product with Modular Architecture
Product Function Hierarchy     Product Structure Hierarchy Product Function Hierarchy       Product Structure Hierarchy
 Non-modular Production (assembly) Processes ɹɹɹɹModular Production (assembly) Processes
Main Line
Process Hierarchy Product Structure Hierarch Process Hierarchy  Product Structure Hierarch
Legends: F = Product Function as a Whole,  S = Product Structure as a Whole腀
F1, F2=Sub-functions of the Product ,  f1 - f4 = Sub-sub-functions of the Product 
S1, S2 = Large Modules,     s1 - s4 = Small Modules
  -------------  = connection



















































    Legends: P = Production (assembly) Process as a Whole,   S1, S2 = Large Modules,    s1 to s4 = Small Modules
  腀腀腀腀  P1= Main Line Process,    p1 to p2 = Sub-line Processes
                    =   Process Flow                                                                             = Assembly Line
                    =   Inter-firm Relationship                                                                      
                                                                                                                            =  Inter-firm Division of Labor
 (3) Modularization in Supplier Systems
  (Multiple Hierarchies of Production Process and Inter-Firm Systems)
Non-modular Supplier System Modular Supplier System 
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Table 1 Recent Changes of Component Development and Production 
In the Japanese Auto Industry 
(Results of a Questionnaire Survey with First-tier Suppliers) 
 
Note: This table is based on the results of a questionnaire survey with 153 Japanese first-tier suppliers, 
which was conducted in February and March 1999, in Japan. The respondents answered the degree of 
changes in each item. Scores were: “changed” = 2, “no changes” = 0, “changed adversely” = -2. Columns 
are the four factors identified by a factor analysis. 膜 indicates that the item had a strong correlation with 
the corresponding factor. The scores in the bottom rows are the average scores for the items with a 
strong correlation with the factor. See Fujimoto, Matsuo, and Takeishi (1998) for the details of the 
questionnaire survey, and Ku (2000) for the results of the factor analysis. 


















Size of the component reduced with the same basic
structure. 膜 0.31
2 Number of parts making up the component increased. 膜 0.02
3
Number of assembly process steps for the component
increased. 膜 0.09
4
Component has been incorporated into an other assembly
component 0.07
5
Process steps and costs to assemble the component
decreased with the adoption of integrally-molded parts. 0.47
6
Component design was shared by different models of the
same automaker. 膜 0.44
7
Component design was shared between different
variations of the same model. 膜 0.57
8
Component design was standardized across different
automakers. 0.19
9
Component design was shared by the current and earlier
models. -0.11
10 Number of variations within a vehicle model decreased. 0.19
11
Number of interfaces (such as contact points) with other
components decreased. 膜 0.13
12
Designs of interfaces (such as contact points) with other
components were simplified. 膜 0.19
13
Designs of interfaces (such as contact points) were
standardized within a model. 膜 0.28
14
Designs of interfaces (such as contact points) were
standardized between different variations of a model. 膜 0.40
15
Designs of interfaces (such as contact points) were
standardized across different automakers. 0.09
16
Function of the model became more self-contained
(independent). 膜 0.11
17
Function of the model became more complex (with more
functions required). 膜 0.62
18
Need for functional coordination with other components
increased 膜 0.62
19
 Need for structural coordination with other components
(such as checking matching and interference. 膜 0.63
Average Score 0.42 0.62 0.19 0.05 0.28 
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Figure 2 Changes in Scope of Subassembly Around Instrument Panels   
at Japanese Automakers' Assembly Plants 
 
 
This figure plots the relationship between the number of components sub-assembled around the 
instrument panels, and the year in which the model in question was introduced to market.  
The scores are all mean-centered within each automaker. For the year of market introduction, the score 
measures a difference between the year in which the model in question was launched and the average 
year in which the automaker' s sample models were launched. The higher the score, the newer the model 
is among the automaker's models in the sample. For the scope of subassembly, the score measures a 
difference between the number of components sub-assembled for the model in question and the average 
number of components sub-assembled for the automaker’s sample models. The higher the score, the 
larger the scope of subassembly is among the automaker’s models in the sample. 
Components examined for subassembly include: instrument panels, gauges, meter panels, glove 
compartments, wire harnesses, air conditioner switches, air conditioner units, air conditioner blowers, air 
conditioner ducts, air vents, audio systems, navigation systems, steering shafts, steering columns, 
steering switches, ignitions, column shifts, air bags (for drivers), air bags (for passengers), cup holders, 
ashtrays, pedals, and cross members (23 components). 
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